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ABSTRACT: In the first part of this paper I argue that beauty 
and goodness are at least coextensive for Plato. That means that 
at least with respect to concrete particulars, everything that is 
good is beautiful and everything that is beautiful is good. Though 
the good and the beautiful are coextensive, there is evidence 
that they are not identical. In the second part of the paper I 
show significance of this relation. In ethics it implies that the 
good is the right. It also allows one to see how platonists can 
believe that goodness exists in mathematics. And it explains the 
usefulness of mathematics in moral education.
KEYWORDS: Plato, beauty, goodness, coextension, 
mathematics
RESUMO: Na primeira parte deste artigo argumento que o 
belo e o bem são, pelo menos, coextensivos para Platão. Isso 
significa que, pelo menos no que diz respeito às características 
concretas, tudo o que é bom é belo, e tudo o que é belo, é bom. 
Embora o bem e o belo sejam coextensivos, há evidências de 
que não são idênticos. Na segunda parte do artigo, mostro o 
significado desta relação. Na ética implica que o bem é o correto. 
Permite também ver como é possível aos platônicos acreditar 
que exista bondade nas matemáticas. E isso explica o uso das 
matemáticas na educação moral. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Platão, beleza, bondade, co-extensivi-
dade, matemática
1. Introduction
In this paper I would like to explore the rela-
tion between goodness (to agathon) and beauty (to 
kalon) in Plato. In the first place it will be argued 
that the evidence suggests that at the very least 
Plato believed there was a biconditional relation 
between goodness and beauty. That is, everything 
that is beautiful is good and everything that is 
good is beautiful. However, the evidence concer-
ning the relation between beauty and goodness 
almost always has to do with concrete particulars, 
as opposed to Forms. In other words, it is almost 
always the case that where Plato speaks about the 
relation between beauty and goodness he is spe-
aking about concrete particulars, whether these be 
persons, actions, or other objects of the sensible 
world. Very little, if anything, is explicitly said about 
the relation between beauty and goodness in the 
intellectual realm, the realm of the Forms. There 
are only a few passages where Plato could be taken 
to be speaking about beauty and goodness in the 
intellectual realm, and even in these few passages 
it has to be argued that he is in fact referring to the 
Forms. Thus when I say that beauty and goodness 
are biconditionally related in Plato, this has to be 
taken as referring to the sensible realm of concrete 
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particulars. Of course, what we would perhaps most 
like to know is how beauty and goodness are related 
at the level of the Forms. In particular we would 
like to know whether there are two Forms or one, 
i.e. whether the Form of the Good is the same as 
the Form of the Beautiful. Unfortunately, Plato says 
next to nothing about this, and thus the most we 
can do is speculate about the relation of the Forms. 
In the final analysis, I will argue that the evidence 
suggests that there are two Forms, and that the 
Form of the Good is distinct from the Form of the 
Beautiful. However, it seems that this was not at 
all a major concern of Plato and that he was much 
more concerned to show the closeness, if not virtual 
identity, between beauty and goodness, than he was 
to explore the question concerning the identity or 
difference between their Forms. 
But, having shown the biconditional relation 
between beauty and goodness in Plato, the question 
becomes, what are we to make of this? What are the 
consequences of this for Plato’s thought? I want to 
argue that this fact has consequences for two areas 
of Plato’s thought: ethics and mathematics. As it 
does for Aristotle, to kalon for Plato has above all 
to do with mathematics and mathematical concepts. 
The consequences of this for Plato’s ethics turns 
out to be that goodness in ethics has to do with 
the instantiation of mathematical concepts such 
as measure and proportion. To be ethically good is 
to instantiate such things as equality, moderation, 
and due proportion in one’s actions. On the other 
hand, the coextension of beauty and goodness 
resulted for Plato in the collocation of goodness 
in mathematics as well. Because beauty exists in 
mathematics, and everything that is beautiful is 
good for Plato, it seems he concluded that goodness 
exists in mathematics as well. 
In this respect, as in so many others, it is 
instructive to compare Aristotle’s views with those 
of Plato. At Metaphysics M, Aristotle explains he 
understanding of the relation between beauty and 
goodness. At 1078a31 he states,
Now since the good and beautiful are different (for 
the former is always in action, while the beautiful is 
found also in motionless things), those who assert that 
the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful 
or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove 
a very great deal about them; for it is not the case that 
if they do not name them but prove their results and 
accounts, that they do not speak about them. The chief 
forms of beauty are order, proportion, and definiteness, 
which the mathematical sciences demonstrate most of 
all. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are 
causes of many things, evidently they mean that such 
a cause as the beautiful is a cause in a way. But we 
shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.
1
Setting aside many of the intriguing ques-
tions about this passage,
2
 we can at least see that 
Aristotle clearly distinguishes the good from the 
beautiful. Goodness, he says here, always requires 
a context of action (πρᾶξις). His point seems to 
be that some sort of desire and ability to achieve 
is implicit in the very concept of goodness. Thus 
where there is no desire or ability to achieve, it is 
inappropriate to apply the concept of goodness. In 
fact this is precisely how he criticizes the Platonic 
view that goodness exists in mathematics, in his 
Eudemian Ethics. In the context of an argument 
against the academic application of goodness to 
mathematics, Aristotle argues that there cannot 
be goodness in mathematics because mathematical 
objects cannot desire. At 1218a24-26, he states,
And it is a bold way to demonstrate that unity is 
the good per se to say that numbers have desire; for no 
one says distinctly how they desire.
3
In this paper, then, I will argue that Plato and 
Aristotle had remarkably similar understandings of 
beauty (to kalon), but this passage from Aristotle 
shows that they differed in their understanding of 
goodness. For Aristotle goodness, as the final cause, 
always has to imply some sort of desire, but this 
seems not to have been true all the time for Plato. 
2. The Translation of Kalos
Before beginning this investigation however, 
a word must be said about the vexed question of the 
correct translation of the Greek word kalos. Kalos is 
1. All translations of Aristotle 
will be those found in Jonathan 
Barnes, ed. The Complete Works 
of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1984). If a revision is 
necessary it will be marked ‘rev.’
2. For instance, what is meant by 
the claim that the mathematical 
sciences “prove their results (erga) 
and accounts (logoi)?” And in 
what sense are order, proportion, 
and definiteness the “causes” of 
many things, and how does this 
make beauty a cause in a way? In 
what sense can beauty be thought 
of as a cause?
3. ROT. παράβολος δὲ καὶ 
ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ 
τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ 
ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς 
ἐφίενται λέγονται φανερῶς.
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the adjectival form of the noun kallos. Almost no 
one questions the fact that the noun kallos should 
be translated ‘beauty’.
4
 Despite this fact, there is 
a great debate in the literature about whether the 
adjective kalos should be translated ‘beautiful’. 
This is significant because both Plato and Aristotle 
instantiate the Ancient Greek preference for using 
nominalized forms of adjectives as substantives 
rather than the nouns, i.e. the Ancient Greek often 
prefers to speak about ‘the true’ rather than about 
‘truth.’ Thus there are far more instances of the use 
of the substantive to kalon, in Plato and Aristotle 
than there are of kallos. 
A typical example of statements to the effect 
that ‘beauty’ is not the best translation for kalos 
comes to us from Paul Woodruff in his commentary 
on the Hippias Major. He states:
Like beauty, to kalon is something splendid and 
exciting; and in women or boys it is the loveliness that 
excites carnal desire. But the use of kalos for that quality 
is embraced by its use as a quite general term of com-
mendation in Greek. “Noble,” “admirable,” and “fine” 
are better translations, and of these “fine” is best of 
all in virtue of its great range. Different sorts of things 
are commended as kala for different sorts of qualities: 
boys for their sex appeal, horses for their speed, fighting 
cocks for their spunk, families for their lineage, acts of 
war for their courage, speeches for their truth, and so 
on. Our “beautiful” translates kalos in only a few of its 
many uses, and is wholly inappropriate for the word as 
Socrates uses it.
5
On the other side of the matter, in his com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Joe Sachs writes,
Aristotle says plainly and repeatedly what it is that 
moral virtue is for the sake of, but the translators are 
afraid to give it to you straight. Most of them say it 
is the noble. One of them says it is the fine. If these 
answers went past you without even registering, that 
is probably because they make so little sense. To us, 
the word “noble” probably connotes some sort of high-
-minded naiveté, something hopelessly impractical. But 
Aristotle considers moral virtue the only practical road to 
effective action. The word “fine” is of the same sort but 
worse, suggesting some flimsy artistic soul who couldn’t 
endure rough treatment, while Aristotle describes moral 
virtue as the most stable and durable condition in which 
we can meet all obstacles. The word the translators are 
afraid of is to kalon, the beautiful.
6
Although Woodruff is speaking about Plato 
and Sachs about Aristotle, these two scholars 
illustrate the range of opinion on the question of 
to kalon in the study of both Plato and Aristotle. 
I will not pretend to resolve this debate here.
7
 But 
I would just like to present a reason for preferring 
the translation ‘beautiful’ in Plato. Regardless of 
their position on the question in general, everyone 
that I know of agrees that ‘beautiful’ is the correct 
translation of kalos in the Symposium. But in that 
dialogue Plato explicitly extends the application of 
kalos to those to objects we may find difficult to 
apply the concept ‘beauty’. Woodruff argues that 
kalos should not be translated ‘beautiful’ because 
it is applied to objects we would not normally apply 
the concept of beauty. Yet in the ascent to the Form 
of the Beautiful in the Symposium Diotima does 
exactly this. At 210b-e, she states,
After this he must think that the beauty of people’s 
souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies, 
so that if someone is decent in his soul, even though 
he is scarcely blooming in his body, our lover must be 
content to love and care for him and to seek to give 
birth to such ideas as will make young men better. 
The result is that our lover will be forced to gaze a 
the beauty of practices and laws and to see that all 
this is akin to itself, with the result that he will think 
that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance. 
After practices he must move on to various kinds of 
knowledge. The result is that he will see the beauty of 
knowledge and be looking mainly not at beauty in a 
single example—as a servant would who favored the 
beauty of a little boy or a man or a single custom (being 
a slave, of course, he’s low and small-minded)—but 
the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty, and, 
gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously 
beautiful ideas and theories, in the unstinting love of 
wisdom… (rev.)
8
4. See the entry under κάλλος 
in LSJ. The only exception to 
this I have been able to find is 
Collingwood, who writes, “… 
κάλλος does not mean beauty,” 
and that “As the Greeks have no 
word for art, so they have no word 
for beauty.” R. G. Collingwood, 
“Plato’s Philosophy of Art,” Mind 
34(1925): pp. 161-2, cf. pp. 65-6. 
Unfortunately, Collingwood provides 
no evidence for his claims here about 
κάλλος.
5. Paul Woodruff, Plato: Hippias Major 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). p. 110. 
Christopher Janaway writes “Many 
salient examples of things that are 
kalos are indeed beautiful things, 
and the word in ordinary Greek when 
applied to people and physical things 
has a central meaning to do with 
visual attractiveness. Nevertheless 
kalos is a term with a much wider 
use as well, and is more like ‘noble,’ 
‘admirable,’ or ‘fine.’ It will pay to 
remember this, otherwise we run 
the risk of over-aestheticizing Plato. 
Inadvertency must not lead us to 
construe Plato’s ultimate aspiration 
as purely aesthetic; the highest value 
is located for him in something more 
all-embracing, which for now we 
may call ‘fineness itself.’” Christopher 
Janaway, Images of Excellence: 
Plato’s Critique of the Arts  (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995). p. 59. In support 
of his claim he cites Terry Irwin, who 
writes, “There is no reason to believe 
that the use of ‘kalon’ for what 
we call moral properties indicates 
that the Greeks have a particularly 
‘aesthetic’ attitude to morality, as the 
translation ‘beautiful’ might suggest.” 
Terence Irwin, Plato: Gorgias 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1979). 
p. 154. However, Irwin provides 
no evidence that the Greeks did 
not have a particularly “aesthetic” 
attitude to morality, and, on the 
contrary, the pervasive use of καλόν 
in what we might call moral contexts 
could very well be taken as at least 
some indication that the Greeks 
were more inclined than we are to 
evaluate moral actions in terms of 
beauty. Cf. also W. K. C. Guthrie, A 
History of Greek Philosophy, VI vols., 
vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1969). p. 170. (However, 
see also his discussion of τὸ 
καλόν in volume IV, pp. 177-
78.) E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias. A 
Revised Text with Introduction and 
Commentary  (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1959). p. 249. J. C. B. Gosling, Plato: 
Philebus. Translated with Notes and 
Commentary  (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1975). p. 93. Dorothea Frede, Plato: 
Philebus  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1993). p. lxiv.
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6. Joe Sachs, “Aristotle: Ethics,”  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-
eth/.
7. For an attempt to defend 
this thesis see Nicholas Riegel, 
“Beauty, To Kalon, and Its 
Relation to the Good in the Works 
of Plato” (Dissertation, University 
of Toronto, 2011).
8. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς 
ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον 
ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, 
ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς ὢν 
τὴν ψυχήν τις κἂν σμικρὸν 
ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ 
ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν 
λόγους τοιούτους καὶ ζητεῖν, 
οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους 
τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ 
αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς 
ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις 
καλὸν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν 
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συγγενές ἐστιν, 
ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν 
σμικρόν τι ἡγήσηται εἶναι· 
μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα 
ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, 
ἵνα ἴδῃ αὖ ἐπιστημῶν 
κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων 
πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν 
μηκέτι τὸ παρ’ ἑνί, ὥσπερ 
οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου 
κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς 
ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, 
δουλεύων φαῦλος ᾖ καὶ 
σμικρολόγος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος 
τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν 
πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους 
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ 
διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ 
ἀφθόνῳ… All translations of 
Plato will be those of John M. 
Cooper, ed. Plato: Complete Works 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). If 
a revision is necessary it will be 
marked ‘rev.’
9. ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; 
ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ; ΜΕΝ. 
Γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ΣΩ. 
Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ 
κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν 
γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ 
κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ; 
ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι 
τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ 
καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι 
βλάπτει. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί 
σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι 
κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ 
κακὰ ὠφελεῖν; ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ 
μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε. [Socrates: 
Do you think, Meno, that anyone, 
knowing that bad things are bad, 
nevertheless desires them? Meno: 
I certainly do. Socrates: What do 
you mean by desireing? Is it to 
secure for oneself? Meno: What 
else? Socrates: Does he think that 
the bad things benefit him who 
possesses them, or does he know 
they harm him? Meno: There are
In the first place we can note that kallos and 
kalos are used interchangeably in this passage. Sec-
ond, we see that beauty, kallos, is to be found in the 
soul. This in itself might seem like an extension of 
our concept of beauty insofar as we might think that 
beauty is only applicable to bodies and other physi-
cal, perceptible objects. But the key point for our 
purposes is the extension of the beautiful, to kalon, 
to “practices and laws” (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι 
καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν). We might not normally 
extend the concept of beauty to practices and laws, 
and scholars who agree with Woodruff take this as 
evidence that kalos should not be translated ‘beauti-
ful’. But here in the Symposium Plato explicitly states 
that the same concept of beauty that is found in 
physical beauty is also found in practices and laws. 
Let me quickly recap the main points. First, 
everyone agrees that kalos in the Symposium should 
be translated ‘beautiful’. Second, Plato clearly 
applies the concept of the kalos to practices and 
laws in the ascent to the Form of the Beautiful. It 
would seem then that it is not valid to argue that 
since Plato uses the concept of kalos in context 
where we would normally not use the concept of 
beauty, that therefore ‘beautiful’ is not the correct 
translation of kalos.
But I do not want to suggest that we must 
dogmatically translate kalos ‘beautiful’ in every 
instance. To kalon, for Plato is a quality which su-
pervenes upon the essential rightness of a person, 
object, or action. This essential rightness can be 
described variously as ‘fine,’ ‘noble,’ ‘admirable,’ 
etc. I choose ‘beautiful’ for the reason mentioned 
above, as well as the feeling that this was its origi-
nal meaning, and because it allows us to read Plato 
and Aristotle in what I feel are new and interesting 
ways. The other translations strike me as bland and 
vague, and seem to turn to kalon into just another 
term of approbation; whereas, in the original Greek 
to kalon seems to suggest something more specific. 
But, as I have already said, much of this is subjec-
tive. There are many word-concepts in the ancient 
Greek language with present similar difficulties: 
eudaimonia (usually translated ‘happiness’), arete 
(‘virtue’), sophrosune (‘temperance/ moderation’) 
ousia (‘essence/ being’), logos (‘word/ account’), to 
name just a few. And the best we can do is choose 
an inadequate translation and warn the reader of 
the problems. 
One final note worth mentioning about to 
kalon is the way in which it differs from to agathon, 
the good. While a review of the literature of fifth 
and fourth century Greece seems to suggest that 
kalos refers to the essential rightness of a person, 
thing, or action, to agathon seems more closely 
connected with some kind of benefit or advantage. 
So at Meno 77d Socrates gets Meno to agree that 
those who desire bad things thinking that they will 
benefit from them actually do not think those bad 
things are bad.
9
 In other words they are mistaken 
about those objects. They think that they are good 
and thus beneficial; they are just mistaken. Here 
Socrates assumes that what is good is beneficial and 
what is bad is harmful. And at Gorgias 477a Socrates 
argues that if someone has good things being done 
to him he is being benefited.
Socrates: Hence, the one paying what is due has good 
things being done to him? Polus: Evidently. Socrates: 
Hence he is being benefited? Polus: Yes.
10
In addition, goodness often has a directional 
quality about it. So, as Rachel Barney points out, 
goodness in Greek often takes the dative of inter-
est: things are commonly said to be good for this 
or that person or object; whereas beauty rarely does 
so: what is beautiful is simply beautiful.
11 
3. Coextension
In this section we will try to show that Plato 
believes a biconditional relation holds between 
beauty and goodness at least at the level of con-
crete objects, or what are sometimes called sensible 
particulars. In the following section we will present 
reasons for believing that despite their coextension 
at the level of concrete objects, the balance of the 
evidence supports the view that Plato still thought 
there were separate Forms of beauty and goodness. 
We will begin by looking at passages which suggest 
that what is good is beautiful. Then we will look 
at passages which suggest that what is beautiful is 
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some who believe that the bad 
things benefit them, others who 
know that the bad things harm 
them. Socrates: And do you think 
that those who believe that bad 
thing benefit them know that they 
are bad? Meno: No, that I cannot 
altogether believe (Meno 77c-d).]
10. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ 
δίκην διδούς; ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. 
ΣΩ. Ὠφελεῖται ἄρα; ΠΩΛ. Ναί.
11. “But there is one striking 
contrast between the two. This is 
that while it is common to speak 
of what is agathon for someone, 
using the dative of interest, the 
same construction is awkward and 
rare if not impossible with kalon. 
Moving from grammar to ideas, 
what is good is often presumed to 
be so by being good for somebody 
or other; but what is fine, generally 
speaking, is just plain fine.” Rachel 
Barney, “The Fine and the Good,” 
(Forthcoming). And Dominic Scott 
writes, “In Plato’s works, the 
concept of the agathon is very 
closely connected with whatever 
is beneficial or useful – prima facie 
a different sense from that of 
kalon.” Dominic Scott, Plato’s Meno 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
2006). p. 46.
12. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works; 
W. R. M. Lamb, Plato: Lysis, 
Symposium, Gorgias  (London: 
Heinemann, 1925); Terry Penner 
and Christopher Rowe, Plato’s Lysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
2005). ad loc. and see pp. 102-3.
good, followed by evidence which directly supports 
a biconditional relation. 
But first a word about these terms bicondi-
tional and coextensive. For the purposes of this 
essay I take these terms to imply the same thing. 
In other words, to say that there is a biconditional 
relation between beauty and goodness is to say both 
A. If something is good then it is beautiful, and B. 
If something is beautiful then it is good. This is 
the same as to say that beauty and goodness are 
coextensive. That is, everything which falls under the 
extension of goodness falls under the extension of 
beauty and vice versa. Notice that neither of these 
imply that goodness and beauty and identical. If 
two objects are essentially identical, then they must 
have the same extension. But it is not the case that 
if two objects are coextensive, they are essentially or 
“intensionally” identical—intensional identity being 
taken as the linguistic correlate of essential identity. 
To borrow an example from Quine, whatever has a 
heart has a kidney, but it is not the case that having 
a heart is essentially the same as having a kidney. 
3.1. That Whatever is Good is 
Beautiful: Symposium 201c, Timaeus 
87c, Lysis 216d, and Republic 457b.
Several texts indicate Plato thinks everything 
good is also beautiful. The first is at Symposium 
200a-201b where Socrates tries to prove to Agathon 
that Love is neither beautiful nor good. In order to 
prove that Love is not good, Socrates asks Agathon, 
“Don’t good things also seem beautiful to you 
(τἀγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; 201c)?” 
Agathon agrees, and Socrates goes on to argue that 
if Love needs and desires beautiful things and good 
things are beautiful, then Love will need and desire 
good things, and therefore Love cannot be good 
either (201c). If we can take Socrates’ question 
here as evidence of his own belief then this would 
support the view that Plato believes that what is 
good must also be beautiful.
The next text is from the Timaeus. When 
Timaeus turns to the care of body and mind, he 
states, “Now all that is good is beautiful, and 
what is beautiful is not ill-proportioned (πᾶν δὴ 
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον: 
87c).” Given the context, what Timaeus must mean 
is that good things are beautiful. His argument is 
that since good things are beautiful, and beautiful 
things are proportionate (σύμμετρον, 87c), if 
persons want to be good or healthy, they must be 
proportionate, in particular their bodies have to be 
in proportion to their souls (87c ff.). Since Timaeus 
is speaking about bodies and souls, he is speaking 
about things, plural, which are to be good. Thus if 
we can take Timaeus’ statements to represent Plato’s 
beliefs, it would seem Timaeus 87c can be taken to 
confirm the view that Plato thinks if something is 
good then it is also kalon, or beautiful.
In the Lysis too we have confirmation of 
the conditional relationship between goodness 
and beauty. Socrates states, “Now I maintain that 
the good is beautiful. What do you think? (λέγω 
γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι· σὺ δ’ οὐκ οἴει: Ly. 
216d).” The Greek grammar does not allow us to 
discern whether kalon is a predicate adjective or a 
predicate substantive, nor does the context allow us 
to disambiguate. This sentence may mean that the 
good is the beautiful, or that the good is beautiful. 
Stanley Lombardo, W. R. M. Lamb, and Penner and 
Rowe all have “the good is beautiful.”
12
 If they are 
correct, this would support the thesis that Plato 
thinks if good then beautiful.
Finally, we may also refer to Republic 457b, 
where Socrates states, “… for it is and always will 
be the finest saying that the beneficial is beauti-
ful, while the harmful is ugly (κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ 
τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν 
ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν).” 
Like the other passages, these translations would 
support the thesis that whatever is good is beauti-
ful, except that here the beneficial (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) 
is said to be beautiful. But, as we have already seen, 
Plato’s usual conception of the good is very closely 
linked to the beneficial. Thus (ignoring the Hippias 
Major for the moment) if Plato thinks of goodness as 
beneficence then Republic 457b supports the thesis 
that whatever is good is beautiful.
In conclusion, even if we do not accept 
Republic 457b, Plato’s belief that if something is 
good then it is also beautiful is well supported. 
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Plato seems to believe that this thesis needs no 
argument. He seems less certain, however, about 
the converse, the thesis that whatever is beautiful 
is good. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to 
say he seems less certain that this thesis would 
be immediately accepted. For anyone who knew 
the Iliad or Theogony could easily think there are 
beautiful things which are not good. 
3.2. That Whatever is Beautiful 
is Good: Alcibiades 113d-116d; 
Protagoras 349a-362a; Charmides 
160e-61a; Laches 192c-d; Meno 77b.
While the thesis that whatever is good is 
beautiful is fairly certain, the converse may seem 
more questionable. But there is evidence for the 
thesis that whatever is beautiful is good in the 
Alcibiades, Protagoras, Charmides, Laches, and Meno. 
Let us turn directly to these arguments to evaluate 
the evidence. 
In the Alcibiades Socrates uses the premise 
that all beautiful things are good during an argu-
ment to prove to Alcibiades that all just things are 
beneficial. In support of this premise he makes 
two arguments. The first, from 115c-16a attempts 
to show that insofar as courage and helping one’s 
friends in battle is beautiful it is also good. We 
need not enter into the details of the argument. 
It is enough for our purposes merely to show the 
conclusion. At 116a Socrates states, 
Isn’t it also beautiful insofar as it’s good, and ugly 
insofar as it’s bad (rev.)?
13
The second argument in support of the pre-
mise that all beautiful things are good runs from 
116b-c, and Socrates concludes as follows:
Soc: So the same thing appears for us again both 
beautiful and good. Alc: Apparently. Soc: So if we find 
that something is beautiful, we’ll also find that it’s 
good – according to this argument, at least (rev.).
14
Both of the arguments Socrates uses here 
are very complex and problematic, but it is clear 
what he is trying to prove. He is trying to prove 
that everything that is beautiful insofar as it is 
beautiful is also good. 
The second passage supporting the view that 
whatever is beautiful is good comes from the Pro-
tagoras. After the discussion of Simonides’ poem, 
Socrates argues against Protagoras’ revised thesis 
that, while the rest of the virtues are similar and 
can be described as kinds of knowledge or wisdom, 
courage is different. In the course of arguing that, 
like the other virtues, courage is some sort of 
knowledge and wisdom, Socrates takes advantage 
of his Protagoras’ assent to the view that whatever 
is beautiful is good. 
Then, if it is beautiful, we agreed earlier that it is also 
good, for we agreed that all beautiful actions are good. 
You speak truly, and it always seems so to me (rev.).
15
And again a few lines later he states,
So, generally, when the courageous fear, their fear is 
not ugly; nor when they are confident is their confidence 
ugly. True. If not ugly, is it beautiful? He agreed. If 
beautiful, then also good? Yes (rev.).
16
It is true that Socrates does not present an 
argument for these claims, but we are beginning 
to see that he likes to take it as a premise that 
whatever is beautiful is also good. 
The next passage is from the Charmides. At 
160e Socrates argues from the fact that temperan-
ce, or moderation, is beautiful to the fact that it 
is good:
But, I said, didn’t we agree just now that temperance 
was a beautiful thing? Yes, we did, he said. And it would 
follow that temperate men are good? Yes. And could 
a thing be good that does not produce good men? Of 
course not. Then not only is temperance beautiful, but 
it is good. I agree (rev.).
17
The argument here, if there is one, is not 
straightforward. But in order to be successful it 
must rely on the hidden premise that whatever is 
beautiful is good. 
13. Ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν, 
καλόν· ᾗ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν 
(116a);
14. ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν 
πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. 
ΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἂν ἄρα 
εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν 
εὑρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ 
λόγου (116b-c).
15. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ 
ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς 
ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς 
πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς 
ὡμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, 
καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως 
(359e). This premise is apparently 
based on the previous agreement 
made at 358b: Τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, 
ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ 
τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ 
τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, 
ἆρ’ οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὠφέλιμοι]; 
καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν 
τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον; Συνεδόκει 
(358b). [Well then, men, I said, 
what about this? All actions leading 
to this, namely to living painlessly 
and pleasantly, are they not 
beautiful [and beneficial]? And isn’t 
beautiful activity both good and 
beneficial? They agreed (tr. Cooper, 
ed., rev.).]
13. Ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν, 
καλόν· ᾗ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν 
(116a);
14. ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν 
πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. 
ΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἂν ἄρα 
εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν 
εὑρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ 
λόγου (116b-c).
15. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ 
ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς 
ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς 
πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς 
ὡμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, 
καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως 
(359e). This premise is apparently 
based on the previous agreement 
made at 358b: Τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, 
ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ 
τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ 
τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, 
ἆρ’ οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὠφέλιμοι]; 
καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν 
τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον; Συνεδόκει 
(358b). [Well then, men, I said, 
what about this? All actions leading 
to this, namely to living painlessly 
and pleasantly, are they not 
beautiful [and beneficial]? And isn’t 
beautiful activity both good and 
beneficial? They agreed (tr. Cooper, 
ed., rev.).]
16. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι 
οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους 
φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, 
οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; 
Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, 
ἆρ’ οὐ καλά; Ὡμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ 
καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;  Ναί (360a-b).
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An argument similar to that above, occurs in 
the Laches. At 192c-d, Socrates argues, 
Now this is what appears to me: I think that you 
don’t regard every kind of endurance as courage. The 
reason I think so is this: I am fairly sure, Laches, that 
you regard courage as a very beautiful thing. –One 
of the most beautiful, you may be sure. –And you 
would say that endurance accompanied by wisdom is 
a beautiful and good thing? –Very much so. –Suppose 
it is accompanied by folly? Isn’t it just the opposite, 
harmful and injurious? –Yes. –And you are going to call 
a thing beautiful which is of the injurious and harmful 
sort? –No, that wouldn’t be right, Socrates. –Then you 
won’t allow this kind of endurance to be courage, since 
it is not beautiful, whereas courage is beautiful. You 
are right (rev.).
18
Here Socrates uses the hidden assumption 
that whatever is beautiful cannot be harmful. The 
implication is that whatever is beautiful is beneficial 
and therefore, given our aforementioned connection 
between benefit and goodness, whatever is beautiful 
is also good.
Finally, the Meno also supports the view that 
what is beautiful is good. At 77b pressed to come 
up with something more like a proper definition of 
virtue, Meno says:
So I say that virtue is to desire beautiful things and 
have the power to acquire them.
19
To which Socrates replies:
Do you mean that the man who desires beautiful 
things desires good things? Most certainly.
20
Here Socrates seems at least to be saying that 
if someone desires beautiful things then that person 
desires good things, which supports the thesis that 
whatever is beautiful is good.
Thus we have a good deal of evidence from 
the Alcibiades, Protagoras, Charmides, Laches and 
Meno, that Plato holds the view that whatever is 
beautiful is good.
21
 But this is not all the evidence 
we have. We also have direct evidence of a bicon-
ditional relation between goodness and beauty in 
the Hippias Major.  
3.3. Evidence for a Biconditional 
Relationship between Goodness and 
Beauty: Hippias Major 297b-c.
In the Hippias Major, during the refutation of 
the beneficial as a possible answer to the question 
“What is beauty?” Socrates presents strong evidence 
of a biconditional relation between goodness and 
beauty. The argument is that if the beautiful is the 
beneficial then the beautiful is not good and the 
good is not beautiful. It is taken as obviously absurd 
to say that the good is not beautiful and the beau-
tiful is not good, and therefore the beautiful cannot 
be the beneficial. But if it is obviously absurd to say 
that the good is not beautiful and the beautiful is 
not good then the correct belief must be that what 
is good is beautiful and what is beautiful is good. 
The argument against this is as follows: The 
beneficial is the maker (τὸ ποιοῦν) of the good 
(296e). As such, it is the cause (αἴτιον) of the 
good. But the effect of a cause insofar as it is an 
effect, is an effect, not a cause. Therefore, since 
the beneficial is the maker and cause of the good, 
it must differ from the good. And this conclusion is 
unacceptable to both interlocutors. The conclusion 
of the argument is:
Soc: The cause is not a thing that comes to be, and 
the thing that comes to be is not a cause. Hip: That’s 
true. Soc: Good god! Then the beautiful is not good, nor 
the good beautiful. Or do you think they could be, from 
what we’ve said? Hip: Good god, no. It doesn’t appear 
so to me. Soc: So are we happy with that? Would you 
like to say that the beautiful is not good, nor the good 
beautiful? Hip: Good god, no. I’m not at all happy with 
it (rev.).
22
Socrates says that of all the accounts they 
have given so far, this is the least satisfactory 
to him, and that it is more ridiculous than the 
other accounts. But if it is wrong to say that the 
beautiful is not good and the good is not beauti-
ful, it must be right to say that the beautiful is 
17. Εἶεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐ 
καλὸν ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις τὴν 
σωφροσύνην εἶναι; Πάνυ 
γ’, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ 
ἄνδρες οἱ σώφρονες; Ναί. 
Ἆρ’ οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ 
ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται; Οὐ 
δῆτα. Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα 
καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν 
ἐστιν. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (Chrm. 
160e-61a).
18. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε 
φαίνεται· οὔτι πᾶσά γε, ὡς 
ἐγᾦμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία 
σοι φαίνεται. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ 
ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, 
ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν 
πραγμάτων ἡγῇ σὺ ἀνδρείαν 
εἶναι. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν 
καλλίστων. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν 
μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία 
καλὴ κἀγαθή; Πάνυ γε. 
Τί δ’ ἡ μετ’ ἀφροσύνης; οὐ 
τοὐναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ 
καὶ κακοῦργος; Ναί. Καλὸν 
οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ 
τοιοῦτον, ὂν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ 
βλαβερόν; Οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, 
ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε 
τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν 
ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ 
οὐ καλή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία 
καλόν ἐστιν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἡ 
φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ 
τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη. 
Ἔοικεν.
19. καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω 
ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα 
τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι 
πορίζεσθαι (Men. 77b).
20. Ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν 
καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν 
ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι; Μάλιστά γε 
(Men. 77b).
21. The only passage which I 
think could pose a difficulty for 
the view that everything beautiful 
if good is Gorgias 474c-477a, 
where Socrates analyzes the 
beautiful as what is good/ 
beneficial or pleasant. This would 
make it possible for something 
to be beautiful without being 
good on the condition that it was 
pleasant. But, as Vlastos points 
out, Socrates’ argument here 
relies crucially on changing the 
perspective from which an act or 
object is perceived as pleasant. 
I have argued elsewhere that 
this passage does not in fact 
contradict the view that what 
is beautiful is good in Plato. 
See Gregory Vlastos, “Was Polus 
Refuted,” in Studies in Greek 
Philosophy: Socrates, Plato, and 
Their Tradition, ed. Daniel Graham 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 
1995); Riegel, “Beauty, To Kalon, 
and Its Relation to the Good in 
the Works of Plato,” Chapter 2.
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22. ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον 
γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ 
γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον. ΙΠ. 
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Μὰ Δία, 
ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν 
ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
καλόν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε 
εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων; 
ΙΠ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔ μοι 
φαίνεται ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν 
ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν λέγειν 
ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ 
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν; ΙΠ. Οὐ μὰ 
τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει 
(297c).
23. περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ 
εἴπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε 
ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ’ ἐλθόντες 
κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς 
ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως 
τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον 
ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ 
ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ 
σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, 
ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—
δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν 
ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς 
ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο 
εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα 
ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος 
μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, 
ὥστ’ ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι 
καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον (Phdr. 
250c-e). [Now beauty, as I said, 
was radiant when it was among 
the other objects; and now that 
we have come here we grasp it 
sparkling through the clearest 
of our senses. For vision is the 
sharpest of our bodily senses, 
although it does not see wisdom. 
It would present a terribly 
powerful love if an image of 
wisdom came through our sight 
as clearly as beauty does, and the 
same goes for the other objects 
of love. But now beauty alone 
has this privilege, to be the most 
clearly visible and the most loved 
(rev.).]
24. τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς 
δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ 
ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, 
κἂν <εἰ> μὴ εἴη, ὅμως ταῦτα 
πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ 
δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι 
ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, 
ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν 
δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς 
ἀτιμάζει;
25. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ 
δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, 
κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ 
καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς 
τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν 
αἰτιασαίμεθ’ ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ 
συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς 
ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν 
γεγονέναι.
good and the good is beautiful. And this is the 
biconditional thesis. 
4. Evidence for a Difference between 
the Goodness and Beauty in Plato
It was said at the beginning that while a good 
deal of evidence seems to support the view that 
Plato thinks goodness and beauty are coextensive 
(at least at the level of concrete objects), it is prob-
ably unsafe to infer from this that therefore Plato 
thinks they are identical. In the first place, he never 
in fact says they are identical, though he had plenty 
of opportunity to do so, and in many places such 
an assertion would have helped his argument, for 
example, in the passage in the Hippias Major we have 
already reviewd (297b-c), as well as Symposium 204e 
ff. where Diotima famously substitutes goodness 
for beauty. Though there is not to my knowledge 
of instance where he unambiguously says beauty 
and goodness are identical, there are many places 
where he says that the same thing is both beautiful 
and good, as we have seen in the previous section.
In the second place, Plato clearly says that 
there is a Form of each, beauty and goodness. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the Form of 
Beauty comes from the apex of the ascent to the 
Form of the Beautiful during Diotima’s speech at 
Symposium 211d ff., while the most obvious in-
stance of the Form of the Good is at Republic 509b. 
And each of these Forms is said to have distinct 
qualities. The Form of the Good at Republic 509b is 
famously said to be “beyond essence in power and 
seniority (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ 
δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος),” while in the Phaedrus 
the Form of Beauty is said to be the only Form of a 
positive quality which we can somehow see with our 
eyes (Phdr. 250b-e).
23
 Now, it does not follow from 
the fact that the Form of Beauty is said to have one 
particular quality in one place and that the Form of 
the Good is said to have other qualities in another 
place that the two are not identical. One could still 
argue that ‘beauty’ and ‘goodness’ refer to the same 
thing in the realm of the Forms. But, nevertheless, 
the fact that they are said to have these distinct 
qualities is significant. 
A clearer distinction may seem to come from 
Republic 505d where Socrates states,
In the case of the just and beautiful things, many 
people would choose what are believed to be so, and 
even if they aren’t really so, they act, acquire, and form 
their own beliefs on that basis. But nobody is satisfied 
to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, 
but everyone wants the things that really are good and 
disdains mere beliefs (rev.).
24
This would seem to separate the good from 
the beautiful. While many people are satisfied with 
what only appears just and beautiful, no one is 
satisfied with mere appearance or popular belief 
concerning what is good. But, in the first place, 
note that it does not follow from this that we have 
to abandon our thesis concerning the coextension 
of beauty and goodness. While some people may be 
satisfied with what merely appears beautiful it may 
still be the case that whatever is truly beautiful is 
good and vice versa. And, indeed, as Lloyd Gerson 
has pointed out to me, Socrates here is talking about 
what the many think (hoi polloi). It does not follow 
that philosophers believe the same thing. It may 
well be that philosophers are not satisfied with what 
merely seems just and beautiful, because they know 
that real beauty and justice constitute their good-
ness and happiness. Nevertheless this may point 
to an important distinction between goodness on 
the one hand, and many other things on the other. 
The most definite distinction between beauty 
and goodness, however, comes from the end of the 
Philebus. At 65a Socrates states, 
Therefore if we are not able to capture the good in 
one form, taking it with three, beauty, proportion, and 
truth, let us say that of the things in the mixture we 
would most correctly say that this, as one, is the cause, 
and that it is on account of this, since it is good, that 
it [the mixture] has become thus [i.e. good] (rev.).
25
This is the only place in the Platonic corpus 
where Plato seems to be speaking explicitly about 
the Forms of beauty and goodness and their relation. 
A difference is implied between the Form of the 
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Good and the Form of beauty, because, first, we are 
told that we cannot capture the good in one Form, 
whereas he does not say this about the Forms of 
beauty, proportion, or truth. Secondly beauty seems 
to be one of the three Forms with which the Good 
seems to be identified. Thus this passage would 
seem to indicate a clear distinction between the 
Forms of Beauty and Goodness. But notice that it 
is still entirely possible that beauty and goodness 
are coextensive. 
5. Significance of beauty in Ethics: 
The Good is the Right.
Let us now try to see the significance of 
the biconditional thesis in ethical contexts, and 
in the next section we will look at its significance 
in mathematical contexts. In order to see how 
the biconditional thesis plays out in the ethical 
context we must return to our earlier stated claim 
that to kalon refers to a sort of essential rightness. 
We may, perhaps, see this most clearly in the 
claims of the earlier poets to see death in battle 
as somehow paradigmatically beautiful. So, in the 
Iliad, Priam states,
For a young man all is decorous when he is cut down 
in battle and torn with the sharp bronze, and lies there 
dead, and though dead still all that show about him is 
beautiful; but when an old man is dead and down, and 
the dogs mutilate the grey head and the grey beard and 
the parts that are secret, this for all sad mortality is the 
sight most pitiful (tr. Lattimore).
26
The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus expresses the same 
sentiment:
For this brings shame, when an older man lies fallen 
among the front ranks with the young behind him, his 
head already white and his beard grey, breathing out 
his valiant spirit in the dust, clutching in his hands 
his bloodied genitals – this is a shameful sight and 
brings indignation to behold – his body naked. But 
for the young everything is seemly, as long as he has 
the splendid prime of lovely youth; while alive, men 
marvel at the sight of him and women feel desire, and 
when he has fallen among the front ranks, he is fair 
(tr. Gerber).
27
 
In these two examples the beauty of young 
men is compared to the ugliness of the old when 
they die in battle. But the following excerpt from 
Tyrtaeus provides evidence of the absolute beauty 
of death in battle.
It is a beautiful thing for a good man to die when 
he has fallen among the front ranks while fighting for 
his homeland… (tr. Gerber, rev.).
28
Later, Aeschylus will also speak of death in 
battle as beautiful:
Eteocles, who lieth here, seeing that he hath shown 
loyalty to his country, it is decreed to bury with kindly 
interment in its soil; for that, hating the foe, he courted 
death in the city, and pure of offence towards the shrines 
of his fathers he hath fallen, free of reproach, where 
it is beautiful for the young to fall (tr. Smyth, rev.).
29
 
It may be difficult for us today to imagine 
how seeing a person die in battle could be beautiful. 
But I think what the Greeks were trying to get at 
here was a sense of goodness which is separated 
from benefit at least to the agent. Surely it is not 
beneficial to the person who dies to die in battle. 
Nor is it particularly beneficial for the city to have 
their soldiers die in battle; surely it would be much 
more beneficial to the city for their soldiers to live 
and defeat the enemy than it is for them to die in 
battle. The reason, I think, this activity of dying in 
battle is so paradigmatically beautiful for the Greeks 
is that it represents the ultimate overcoming of all 
self-interest. It represents the ultimate overcoming 
of all considerations of benefit to the agent. But, on 
the other hand, it is not merely sufficient to die or 
sacrifice oneself. It is important here that the death 
be a death in battle, presumably in defense of one’s 
city. And it is no doubt beneficial to the city to have 
young men willing to defend it with their lives. But 
it is still significant, I think, that the actual death 
itself is not particularly to be praised because of its 
benefit to anyone in particular; rather is transcends 
26. ... νέῳ δέ τε πάντ’ 
ἐπέοικεν | ἄρηϊ κταμένῳ 
δεδαϊγμένῳ ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ | 
κεῖσθαι· πάντα δὲ καλὰ 
θανόντι περ ὅττι φανήῃ· | 
ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ πολιόν τε κάρη 
πολιόν τε γένειον | αἰδῶ τ’ 
αἰσχύνωσι κύνες κταμένοιο 
γέροντος, (75) | τοῦτο δὴ 
οἴκτιστον πέλεται δειλοῖσι 
βροτοῖσιν (Il. 22.71-6).
27. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο, 
μετὰ προμάχοισι πεσόντα | 
κεῖσθαι πρόσθε νέων ἄνδρα 
παλαιότερον, | ἤδη λευκὸν 
ἔχοντα κάρη πολιόν τε 
γένειον, | θυμὸν ἀποπνείοντ’ 
ἄλκιμον ἐν κονίηι, | 
αἱματόεντ’ αἰδοῖα φίλαις 
ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντα— (25) | 
αἰσχρὰ τά γ’ ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ 
νεμεσητὸν ἰδεῖν, | καὶ χρόα 
γυμνωθέντα· νέοισι δὲ πάντ’ 
ἐπέοικεν, | ὄφρ’ ἐρατῆς ἥβης 
ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχηι, | ἀνδράσι 
μὲν θηητὸς ἰδεῖν, ἐρατὸς δὲ 
γυναιξὶ | ζωὸς ἐών, καλὸς δ’ 
ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών (Fr. 10, 
ll. 21-30).
28. τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν 
ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα | 
ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧι πατρίδι 
μαρνάμενον… (Tyrt. Fr. 10, 
ll. 1-2).
29. Ἐτεοκλέα μὲν τόνδ’ 
ἐπ’ εὐνοίαι χθονὸς | 
θάπτειν ἔδοξε γῆς φίλαις 
κατασκαφαῖς· | στέγων γὰρ 
ἐχθροὺς θάνατον εἵλετ’ ἐν 
πόλει, | ἱερῶν πατρώιων δ’ 
ὅσιος ὢν μομφῆς ἄτερ (1010) 
| τέθνηκεν οὗπερ τοῖς νέοις 
θνήισκειν καλόν (Th. 1007-11).
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all considerations of benefit and therefore we need 
some word other than ‘good’ or ‘beneficial’ with 
which to describe it. Perhaps to kalon, the beautiful 
was the closest thing the Greeks had to describe it. 
This same separation between beauty and 
goodness or benefit is also seen in Plato, and it was 
precisely this same separation which I think Plato 
wanted to repair. Many of the prooftexts for the 
separation of goodness and beauty are, naturally, 
ones we have already spoken about. So to return 
to Alcibiades 115a-b, Socrates says,  
Socrates: Now what about beautiful things? Are 
they all good, or are some good and others not good? 
Alcibiades: What I think, Socrates, is that some beautiful 
things are bad (Tr. Hutchinson, rev.).
30
 
And we see much the same distinction in the 
Gorgias, where Socrates argues with Polus:
Socrates: What then? Which do you think is uglier, 
doing what’s unjust or suffering it? Tell me. Polus: 
Doing it. Socrates: Now if doing it is in fact uglier, isn’t 
it also worse? Polus: No, not in the least. Socrates: I 
see. Evidently you don’t believe that the same thing 
is both beautiful and good, or that the same thing is 
both bad and ugly. Polus: No, I certainly don’t (Gorgias 
474c-d, rev.).
31
What we see here is how in the Greek mind 
the beautiful was so easily separated from any sense 
of benefit, and yet it was still held to be laudatory 
in some sense. It was Plato’s project then to argue 
that this beauty, which marked essential rightness, 
was in fact the most beneficial thing for the agent. 
6. Significance of Beauty in 
Mathematics: Goodness in 
Mathematics
The second effect or result of the bicondi-
tional thesis may be that it could help explain 
Aristotle’s surprising claim that Plato or the 
Platonists found goodness in mathematics. It 
should be fairly clear that Plato found beauty in 
mathematics. In fact it seems Plato found be-
auty in mathematics most of all. So, at Timaeus 
54a-b?, Timaeus states, 
Of the [right-angled] triangles, the isosceles has but 
one nature, while the scalene has infinitely many. Now 
we have to select the most beautiful one from among 
the infinitely many, if we are to get a proper start. So if 
anyone can say that he has picked out another one that 
is more beautiful for the construction of these bodies, 
his victory will be that of a friend, not an enemy. Of the 
many [scalene right-angled] triangles, then, we posit 
as the one most beautiful, surpassing the others, that 
one from [a pair of] which the equilateral triangle is 
constructed as a third figure (rev.).
32
And at Philebus 51b-c? Socrates states,
What I am saying may not be entirely clear straighta-
way, but I’ll try to clarify it. By the beauty of shape, I do 
not mean what the many might presuppose, namely that 
of a living being or of a picture. What I mean, what the 
argument demands, is rather something straight or round 
and what is constructed out of these with a compass, 
rule, and square, such as plane figures and solids. Those 
things I take it are not beautiful in a relative sense, as 
others are, but are by their very nature forever beautiful 
by themselves. They provide their own specific pleasures 
that are not at all comparable to those of rubbing! And 
colors are beautiful in an analogous way and import 
their own kinds of pleasures.
33
 
With these passages, also see Timaeus 53d-e 
and 55c, and Philebus 65a. So, clearly Plato finds 
beauty in mathematics. What may come as a surprise 
is that, at least according to Aristotle, Plato found 
goodness in mathematics as well. At Eudemian 
Ethics, 1.8 (1218a16-26) he states,
But we should show the nature of the good per se in 
the opposite way to that now used. For now from what 
is not agreed to possess the good they demonstrate the 
things admitted to be good, e.g., from numbers they 
demonstrate that justice and health are goods, for they 
are arrangements and numbers, and it is assumed that 
goodness is a property of numbers and units because 
unity is the good itself… And it is a bold way to demons-
30. ΣΩ. Τί δ’ αὖ τὰ καλά; 
πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά, ἢ 
τὰ μέν, τὰ δ’ οὔ; ΑΛ. Οἴομαι 
ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν 
καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.
31. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον 
πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ 
ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. 
Τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ 
κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον. ΠΩΛ. 
Ἥκιστά γε. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· 
οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγῇ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, 
καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. ΠΩΛ. 
Οὐ δῆτα.
32. τοῖν δὴ δυοῖν τριγώνοιν τὸ 
μὲν ἰσοσκελὲς μίαν εἴληχεν 
φύσιν, τὸ δὲ πρόμηκες 
ἀπεράντους· προαιρετέον οὖν 
αὖ τῶν ἀπείρων τὸ κάλλιστον, 
εἰ μέλλομεν ἄρξεσθαι κατὰ 
τρόπον. ἂν οὖν τις ἔχῃ 
κάλλιον ἐκλεξάμενος εἰπεῖν 
εἰς τὴν τούτων σύστασιν, 
ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἀλλὰ 
φίλος κρατεῖ· τιθέμεθα δ’ 
οὖν τῶν πολλῶν τριγώνων 
κάλλιστον ἕν, ὑπερβάντες 
τἆλλα, ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον 
τρίγωνον ἐκ τρίτου 
συνέστηκεν.
desígnio 12 
153 
jan/jun 2014
trate that unity is the good per se to say that numbers 
have desire; for no one says distinctly how they desire.
34
It is indeed difficult to see how there could 
be goodness in mathematics. Aristotle’s claim at 
Metaphysics, M 3 (1078a31-b6), that while beauty 
exists in mathematics, goodness does not, I suspect, 
seems much more reasonable. But now that we know 
or think we know that Plato believed everything 
beautiful was also good, we can perhaps, see how 
he could locate goodness in mathematics as well. 
He may have reasoned that since mathematics is 
beautiful it must be good as well. 
And this might point to a fundamental diffe-
rence between Plato and Aristotle on the question 
of goodness. Both Plato and Aristotle are remarkably 
similar in their understandings of beauty. Both as-
sociate it above all with proportion, to symmetron. 
Compare Philebus 65a, with Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
M 3 (1078a31-b6). And for both, beauty plays a 
central role in ethics. We have already seen ample 
evidence of this, but it will also be recalled that 
beauty, to kalon, is repeatedly said to be the only 
proper goal of moral virtue in Aristotle’s ethics. If 
there is any validity to Aristotle’s claim that Plato 
located goodness in mathematics then, it would 
appear Plato and Aristotle differed not on the 
beautiful but on the good. For Aristotle, I think, 
goodness is analytically bound up with desire, 
such that if there is no desiring then there is no 
goodness. But perhaps, by assimilating the good 
to the beautiful Plato thought of goodness in a 
way that was possibly separate from desire, such 
that goodness could exist even in a context like 
mathematics where desire plays no role. 
7. Mathematics in Ethics
Finally I would like to talk about a passage 
that brings together the themes of mathematics in 
ethics. At Gorgias 508a, Socrates states, 
Yes, Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and 
friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold 
together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that 
is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, 
and not an undisciplined world-disorder. I believe that 
you don’t pay attention to these facts even though you’re 
a wise man in these matters. You’ve failed to notice 
that proportionate equality has great power among 
both gods and men, and you suppose that you ought 
to practice getting the greater share. That’s because you 
neglect geometry.
35
This is surely one of the most remarkable 
passages in the Platonic corpus. Here Socrates attri-
butes Callicles’ amorality to his lack of appreciation 
for the study of geometry. But what is it about the 
study of geometry that Socrates thinks makes Calli-
cles amoral? He claims that “friendship, orderliness, 
self-control and justice” hold the world together, 
and that “proportionate equality has great power 
among both gods and men”, but even if this were 
so and Callicles recognized it to be so, why should 
that make him give up his amorality? Why should 
the study of geometry make him give up his view 
that the proper goal of life is the “get the greater 
share”? Socrates does not expand on his view here 
and so we must be left to speculate. 
But knowing what we now know about the re-
lation between goodness, beauty, and mathematics 
in Plato’s thought, we may now suggest an answer. 
Socrates may be thinking that if Callicles, or anyone 
else studied geometry and mathematics, they could 
not help seeing the beauty in it. And this sort of 
beauty is real beauty for Plato, this is the true food 
and nourishment of the mind. Once Callicles saw 
this real beauty, he would make the pursuit of truth 
his real goal and no longer be interested in getting 
the greater share of material goods. In addition to 
this, Callicles might wish to imitate the beauty he 
saw in mathematics, and instantiate that beauty 
into his actions. Plato’s thought might be that to 
instantiate this beauty into one’s soul and actions 
is to be become truly good and happy. 
8. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued, first, that ‘be-
autiful’ is at least as good as any other translation 
of kalos. Secondly, I have argued that this beauty 
seems to supervene, for Plato, on a notion of es-
34. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον 
ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύουσι τὸ 
ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ 
τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν 
τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ 
ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ 
δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, ὅτι 
ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια 
ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ 
ἀριθμοί, ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς 
καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν 
ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν 
αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν... παράβολος 
δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ 
ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ 
ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς 
ἐφίενται λέγονται φανερῶς, 
ἀλλὰ λίαν ἁπλῶς τοῦτο 
φασί, καὶ ὄρεξιν εἶναι πῶς ἄν 
τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ 
ὑπάρχει;
35. φασὶ δ’ οἱ σοφοί, ὦ 
Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ 
γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους 
τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ 
φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ 
σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, 
καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ 
ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ 
ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ 
ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς 
οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν 
τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς 
ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ 
ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν 
θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα 
δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει 
δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ 
ἀμελεῖς.
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sential rightness, whereas his sense of goodness 
has more to do with benefit. We then moved on to 
try to show that while there is evidence that the 
Forms of beauty and goodness were distinct, still it 
seemed that there was a great deal of evidence that 
beauty and goodness were coextensive, at least at 
the level of sensible particulars. The consequences 
of this thesis in Plato’s ethics is that he seems 
to assimilate goodness to beauty, more than the 
other way around, that is, he seems to start with 
the accepted understanding of beauty and argue 
that that is what constitutes human goodness. 
In mathematics, this thesis showed the way in 
which Plato or platonists could have thought that 
goodness exists in mathematics. Since beauty and 
goodness are coextensive, and since beauty clearly 
exists in mathematics most of all, it would follow 
that goodness must exist in mathematics as well. 
Finally, we argued, that this may shed some light 
on Socrates’ puzzling claim that if Callicles only 
studied geometry he would see the value of fairness 
and morality, and give up trying to get the greater 
share. It may have been Plato’s view that no one 
could fail to see the beauty of mathematics. And 
that in seeing this beauty humans would see the 
pursuit of truth as their ultimate goal and the 
instantiation of beauty in their soul and actions as 
their true happiness. Whether Plato was right about 
that is another question.  
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